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I. INTRODUCTION
Luck egalitarianism is a doctrine of distributive justice.1 Therefore, its
point is to prescribe and assess real-world distributions of income, wealth, or
welfare.2 Unlike other egalitarian theories, it integrates two different moral
*
© 2022 Horacio Spector. Professor of Law, University of San Diego and
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. I am grateful for comments made by my commentator at
the symposium, Maimon Schwarzschild, and by participants Larry Alexander, Dick
Arneson, David O. Brink, Aaron James, and Andy Koppelman.
1. The label “luck egalitarianism” was introduced by Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is
the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 289 (1999) [hereinafter Anderson, Equality]; she
also uses “equality of fortune.” Though the expression “luck egalitarianism” is a term of
art, it denotes a powerful ideal in the contemporary public debate on equality.
2. I discuss in this essay the view that the distribution of socioeconomic benefits
and burdens should be insensitive (as much as possible) to differences in people’s luck but
sensitive (as much as possible) to differences in people’s voluntary choices. Dan Markovits
calls this doctrine the “responsibility-tracking view”: Daniel Markovits, Luck Egalitarianism and
Political Solidarity, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 271, 275–76. I think that Markovits
misrepresents luck egalitarianism in describing it as oriented to political solidarity.

439

SPECTOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/29/2022 11:14 AM

ideals. I will call these components the principle of equality and the principle
of responsibility. Many writers agree with this interpretation. 3 So, for
example, Richard Arneson says that luck egalitarianism combines two views:
“egalitarianism” and “luckism.” 4 While the former requires distributive
equality, the latter enshrines considerations from individual responsibility.
According to the principle of equality, the institutional structures of society
must ensure that all its members are guaranteed equality of condition. On
the other hand, the principle of responsibility allows inequalities that result
from people’s voluntary choices. Insofar as inequalities are based on
individuals’ voluntary choices, they may be justified departures from equality
of condition. There are two ways to interpret the relationship between the
principle of equality and the principle of responsibility. Under the first
reading, both principles express competing values, and a proper settlement
implies adopting a trade-off between both. On this view, the two principles
are logically independent. Thus, Susan Hurley argues that luck neutralizing
does not independently justify an egalitarian pattern of distribution because
both inequality and equality of condition between two individuals may be
due to none’s responsibility. That is, the recipe to equalize people in the
sense of guaranteeing that each one has a share commensurate with her
choices may paradoxically lead to a nonegalitarian distributive pattern.5
The “trade-off” reading of luck egalitarianism is implausible. In fact,
when we endorse inequalities that are warranted by the principle of responsibility,
we do not sacrifice equality at all. Instead, this principle qualifies the principle
of equality by introducing an exception. Under the second reading, the
principle of responsibility is a defeater of the principle of equality. Thus,
luck egalitarians claim that society should remove any unchosen socioeconomic
inequality. One consequence of the second reading is that all forms of
labor time should be equally rewarded in the absence of voluntary choices
that justify unequal retributions. On this more attractive reading, luck
egalitarianism does not pursue two competing values but only one. The
idea that animates luck egalitarianism is a robust version of equality of
opportunities rather than equality of condition.

3. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 205–13 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN,
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 65–109 (2000); Richard Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for
Welfare, 56 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 77, 77–93 (1989); ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE
(1991); Richard J. Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism Interpreted and Defended, 32 PHILOSOPHICAL
TOPICS 1, 2 (2004) [hereinafter Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism]; G.A. Cohen, On the Currency
of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 29–33, 116–23 (Michael
Otsuka, ed. 2011); LARRY TEMKIN, INEQUALITY (1993); Peter Vallentyne, Brute Luck, Option
Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities, 112 ETHICS 529–57 (2002).
4. Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism, supra note 3.
5. S. L. HURLEY, JUSTICE, LUCK, AND KNOWLEDGE 158–61 (2003).
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Luck egalitarians also offer a criterion for determining when an economic
inequality derives from luck. Thus, any inequality is unfair if the unequal
condition does not result from the voluntary choice of the disadvantaged
or advantaged individual. For example, in “Luck and Equality,” G. A.
Cohen says that the relevant distinction in luck egalitarianism is between
possessing unequal shares as a matter of individual choice and possessing
them because of luck, innate talents, or differential socioeconomic
circumstances. 6 For Cohen, the choice/luck divide is crucial to luck
egalitarianism. Governments should rectify those inequalities that go beyond
people’s voluntary control. Instead, those conditions caused by individuals’
decisions are of their exclusive responsibility and do not violate equality.
The second reading suggests that a luck egalitarian society will be basically
egalitarian with some exceptions permitted by the principle of responsibility.
This picture is flawed. In this essay, I will argue that the principle of
responsibility in practice presupposes inequality of condition. I contend
that a luck egalitarian society will be inegalitarian with some exceptions
that do not preempt the practicability of the principle of responsibility.
Luck egalitarians hold that individual choices justify departures from equality
of condition. I add that these departures are justified as long as they are
commensurate with their social value.
It may be argued (as some luck egalitarians actually do) that those
inequalities that enhance everyone’s advantages via Pareto improvements
are not only permitted but also desirable. But my argument is different. I
claim that implementing the principle of responsibility is, in practice,
inseparable from a massively inegalitarian society because market prices
are not sensitive to desert concerns. I contend that inequalities of condition
are an inescapable upshot of an economic system that permits those chosen
inequalities conducive to improving everyone’s lot via market exchanges.
I will conclude that implementing the principle of responsibility is at odds
with the general practicability of the principle of equality.
Luck egalitarians permit departures from the norm of equality insofar
as these departures derive from individual choices. Though the true social
cost or benefit of those departures can be assessed according to different
methods, in a large and complex society, there is no effective overall method
of social valuation that can dispense with market prices. Two of the leading
defenders of luck egalitarianism, Dworkin and Cohen, concede that market
prices are the best available way to measure the social value of choices. I
6.

G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, supra note 3.
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argue that the claim that market prices are the best method to gauge the
true costs and benefits of individual choices must be accepted as supplementary
to luck egalitarianism. Thus, luck egalitarianism can only defend the principle
of responsibility if it appeals to market prices as a method of social valuation.
Insofar as the principle of responsibility permits inequalities that are
proportionate to each individual’s social deservingness, it becomes in practice
incompatible with equality of condition. It is not that realizing the principle
of responsibility requires a trade-off with the principle of equality. This
idea assumes the first reading of luck egalitarianism. Instead, the realization
of the principle of responsibility presupposes that the community has set
up the institutions needed to operate a system of market prices. This system
is incompatible with a comprehensive policy of equalization of labor and
professional prices. A moderate balance of equality and responsibility is
not an option because the principle of responsibility is practicable only if
equalization of opportunities is confined to the mitigation of obvious forms
of natural or social misfortune. In practical terms, the ideal of equality
of opportunities pursued by luck egalitarianism is anything but robust.
My argument will conclude that the implementation of the principle of
responsibility via a system of market prices produces inequalities of condition
(including unchosen inequalities) in all empirically possible worlds. While it
is common for many normative theories to be confronted with the need to
trade off two or more competing goals, the situation of luck egalitarianism
is different. The price system is in practice incompatible with equality of
condition. Rather than a trade-off between equality and responsibility, the
principle of responsibility swallows up the principle of equality to most
practical effects.
Suppose a community is committed to ensuring individuals’ responsibility
for the socio-economic consequences of their actions. In that case, the principle
of equality must be confined to mitigating those inequalities that derive
from natural or social fortune. Thus, an egalitarian government may implement
social security programs that spread out the risks associated with evidently
unchosen circumstances (e.g., the effects of low-income family backgrounds,
natural handicaps, etc.) while endorsing all the economic inequalities that
are inseparable from a fully operational system of market prices. In practice,
the principle of equality must be confined to government programs that
attach political prices to some basic goods needed to make up for the most
serious forms of inequality caused by unchosen circumstances.
This paper is organized in six sections. In the following section, I discuss
Dworkin’s and Cohen’s views regarding the function of markets in providing
a method of social assessment. I suggest that their treatment of social valuation
is of limited use because it is restricted to rudimentary economic systems
like the immigrants’ island and the camping trip. In section III, I argue
that the principle of responsibility is indeterminate in that it lacks a criterion
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of social value. I also claim that a Paretian interpretation of social value is the
most plausible way to give concrete meaning to the idea of responsibility
defended by luck egalitarians. Section IV contends that market prices’
information and motivational functions are empirically inseparable in any
large feasible or sustainable society. In Section V, I take the argument
from social valuation to its conclusion that the inequalities of condition caused
by market prices are a necessary feature of the Paretian interpretation of
the principle of responsibility in any feasible or sustainable economic system.
In other words, under the assumption that market prices are the only available
method of social valuation in large societies, the principle of responsibility
presupposes the adoption of a system of social valuation that runs afoul
of the principle of equality. Finally, I conclude in Section VI.
II. INEQUALITIES AND THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL VALUATION
Luck egalitarianism was initially suggested as an aspect of a more complex
theory addressing the question of whether we should assess people’s distributive
shares in terms of welfare or resources. Dworkin defended equality of
resources instead of equality of welfare on the grounds that equalizing
welfare leads, in practice, to acknowledging larger shares of wealth or
income for the bearers of expensive preferences.7 He said that an egalitarian
State should remove endowment-sensitive inequalities while endorsing
ambition-sensitive ones. In other words, whereas equality of welfare seeks
to remove both inequalities derived from differential circumstances and
those attributable to each person’s voluntary choices, equality of resources
only opposes inequalities based on differential circumstances.
Dworkin’s intuition is that a person’s professional ambitions and productive
efforts justify deservingness of greater rewards. His distinction between
ambition-sensitive inequalities (based on voluntary choices) and endowmentsensitive inequalities (based on unchosen circumstances) tries to capture
the rejection of the distributive effects of luck and circumstances and, at
the same time, the acceptance of those inequalities that derive from individual
ambitions and efforts. Among the unchosen circumstances, Dworkin includes
one’s innate attributes (talents, abilities, dispositions, etc.) as well as those
features of one’s station (upbringing, education, and so on) that can shape
one’s social and occupational opportunities. The acceptance of ambition-

7.

RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 48–59, 65–99 (2000).
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sensitive inequalities makes it evident that Dworkin seeks to merge the American
ethos of capitalism with the egalitarian ethos distinctive of socialist thought.
The distinction between brute luck and option luck is essential to carry
out Dworkin’s ideological merger. Thus, Dworkin holds that equality
demands rectifying the effects of brute luck, that is, luck that flows from
one’s unchosen circumstances (as opposed to one’s calculated gambles).
Yet, he defends a different view concerning option luck, that is, luck that
results from one’s deliberate gambles.8 Dworkin claims that inequalities
deriving from option luck are permissible. People are responsible for their
choices, but not for the consequences of unchosen circumstances or brute
luck (especially bad brute luck).9
Dworkin holds that the possibility of insurance provides “a link between
the two kinds of luck.”10 Instead of bringing equality of resources to bear
on the real world, he applies it to an imaginary immigrants’ island. Dworkin
interprets the idea of equality of resources in terms of a hypothetical
auction that the immigrants set up to distribute shares of resources. The
auction follows an envy test: “[n]o division of resources is an equal division
if, once the division is complete, any immigrant would prefer someone
else’s bundle of resources to his own bundle.”11 The divider of resources
will find it difficult or impossible to divide the available resources into
identical bundles so that no one envies anyone else’s bundle. Thus, Dworkin
portrays the hypothetical auction as one in which the divider gives every
immigrant an equal number of clamshells that they can use to bid for any
resource auctioneered.12
Dworkin’s enterprise is based on the justification of market inequalities
on option luck and the availability of comprehensive social insurance. He
argues that real-world inequalities may be justified as the outcomes of
choices about insurance coverage made in the fictional island. Dworkin
assumes that all immigrants have equal odds of being afflicted by physical
and mental handicaps and deprived of profitable talents. His central point
is that the possibility of taking social insurance on the island turns brute

8. Id. at 73; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 206–08 (1985).
9. The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fuzzy, especially in its
application to market decisions. For example, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen points out that the
distinction does not match the difference between inequalities for which the disadvantaged are
personally responsible and those for which they are not accountable. Many risky choices
in the marketplace (for example, buying stock or making risky business decisions) produce
unequal outcomes that do not reflect different degrees of responsibility (though they express
various choices). See Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility,
111 ETHICS 571–75 (2001).
10. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 76 (2000).
11. Id. at 67.
12. Id. 66–73.
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bad luck into option bad luck in the real world. But the bridge between
hypothetical insurance taking and consent to real-world inequalities is a
mysterious one. To start with, the hypothetical immigrants would purchase
insurance only if they were risk-averse. Indeed, Dworkin suggests that the
immigrants are not risk-neutral. In fact, he says that “almost no one is
risk-neutral over the full range of his utility curve.”13 He must discard risk
neutrality, as no risk-neutral person would rationally purchase insurance;
it’s only risk-averse people who can obtain a surplus from risk pooling.
But suppose a risk-neutral immigrant is not willing to buy insurance for
handicaps. Why should a risk-neutral person be held responsible for uninsured
misfortunes? It’s also questionable that the dispositions called “risk neutrality”
and “risk aversion” belong to a “person” and not to her “circumstances.”
If risk neutrality is an inborn characteristic, the choice not to pay the premium
and take the insurance is incapable of turning the unprotected misfortunes
into a matter of choice or responsibility. Therefore, the inequalities resulting
from those uninsured misfortunes should not be exempt from the demand
for equalization.
Dworkin claims that equality of resources presupposes a marketplace
because he relies on markets as the best system of social valuation. 14
In fact, he asserts that the social value of resources must be measured in terms
of market prices. Dworkin thinks that if the initial distribution of resources
were equalized, prices would express the true value of resources. In “Why
Liberals Should Care about Equality?” Dworkin also says that if people
started with equal amounts of wealth and equal levels of endowment and
talent, a market allocation would guarantee that no one could legitimately
complain that he had fewer resources than others.15 The problem is that actual
market prices depend on the existing distribution of resources. Thus, he rejects
a pure market economy on the grounds that real-world market allocations
of resources are vitiated by unequal starting points and unequal levels of
productive capacity. In unregulated markets, says Dworkin, prices do not
express the true value of resources.
Dworkin’s creative move is to use a competitive market as a conceptual
tool to formulate luck egalitarianism. In effect, he adopts the notion of
opportunity costs to gauge the social value of products and services. As
explained above, Dworkin appeals to a hypothetical auction to establish

13.
14.
15.

Id. at 95.
Id. at 66.
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 207 (1985).
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the true value of resources to be distributed on the island. Dworkin’s auction
is a Walrasian auction that meets the definition of a perfectly competitive
market (perfect information and no transaction costs).16 However, he secures
the egalitarian character of the auction with two non-Walrasian conditions.
First, the auction proceeds from an initial fair distribution of resources.
Second, the allocation must meet the envy test, which defines a fair distribution
of resources. Thus, he says: “The auction proposes what the envy test in
fact assumes, that the true measure of the social resources devoted to the
life of one person is fixed by asking how important, in fact, that resource
is for others.”17
Dworkin concludes that “market allocations must be corrected in order
to bring some people closer to the share of resources they would have had
but for these various differences of initial advantage, luck, and inherent
capacity.”18 Corrections of market allocations are made through a progressive
tax system. Dworkin conceives of these tax corrections as matching the
social insurance coverage against handicaps and lack of productive talents
that the immigrants would have purchased in further sub-auctions hypothetically
made within the context of the initial auction of resources. Thus, he keeps
the role of markets in revealing information about social valuations but
circumscribes distributional equality to the immigrants’ island and narrows
down the egalitarian agenda in the real world to tax corrections of market
allocations.
While Dworkin places markets at the center of egalitarianism, Cohen
regards market allocations as a necessary evil (that is, necessary as long
as people’s selfish tendencies continue to be exacerbated by capitalistic
mechanisms). Cohen criticizes the argument that economic inequalities are
justified when unequal rewards can incentivize the more productive to work
harder and make the badly off better off. This argument he calls the incentives
argument or the Pareto argument.
Cohen discusses the incentives argument as used both within a deliberative
setting and from an external or third-person perspective. The incentives
argument is relevant because Cohen defends an interpersonal test to assess
normative arguments in dialogical contexts. He says that an argument
fails to justify a policy or arrangement if its justificatory power changes
or dissolves depending on who presents it or to whom it is given. Conversely,
a good argument must justify a policy in all interpersonal contexts, regardless
of who affirms the argument or to whom it is offered.19 Now, the incentives
16. Hal R. Varian, Dworkin on Equality of Resources, 1 ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY
110, 113 (1985).
17. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 70 (2000).
18. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 207 (1985).
19. Id. at 42.
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argument is premised on the factual proposition that unequal rewards are
needed to produce an economic output that will be advantageous also to
the worst off via trickle-down effects. Thus, Cohen contends that the more
talented may not wield the incentives argument in the first person when
they try to justify their unequal shares to the worst off. This is because the
more productive cannot argue from the proposition that differential rewards
are causally necessary to improve the position of the worst-off without being
detrimental to their sense of justice.20 In effect, the truth of this factual proposition
depends on the choices made by the more talented, and, therefore, the incentives
argument cannot justify such decisions.
Cohen assumes that the more talented have a sense of justice and, therefore,
will not utter the incentives argument in the first person within a community
that encompasses them. For example, the more talented could choose to
work as hard at a 60 percent tax rate as at a 40 percent rate unless the work
is especially burdensome. This means that the degree of inequality associated
with the 40 percent rate cannot be justified as needed to make the poor better
off. Therefore, the talented would not present to the poor the argument
that raising the tax rate will worsen the position of the poor. Otherwise, they
would be taking their own choices as unmodifiable data. That is, they would
pretend that the poor’s demand for justification of those choices is misplaced.
But it’s only the lack of membership in a justificatory community that could
render the poor’s request for explanation improper or misplaced. Thus, Cohen
concludes that the incentives argument does not pass the interpersonal test.21
In its third-person use, the Pareto argument holds that some economic
inequalities are necessary to make everyone (including the badly off) better
off. Cohen points out a tension between a commitment to equality (i.e.,
rejecting such morally arbitrary factors as the unequalizing effects of the
natural and social contingencies) and the assertion that a Pareto superior
unequal distribution preserves justice. A commitment to equality means
that you will not prefer an unequal Pareto-superior situation if you can choose
an alternative situation that delivers a similar degree of Pareto improvement
and equalizes distributive shares. Cohen says that if the set of possible social
worlds includes a world in which an unequal distribution is Pareto superior,
it will also contain another possible world that offers a similar Pareto
improvement and yet preserves equality (through redistribution).22 Thus,

20.
21.
22.

G. A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 35–38 (2008).
Id. at 54–62.
Id. at 89–90.
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a Pareto-superior inequality is not necessary if redistribution is a feasible
alternative.
Cohen critiques Rawls’s appeal to the Pareto argument in the reasoning
leading to the difference principle. In his opinion, there are two different
readings of the difference principle: the strict reading and the lax reading.
Under the former, the principle tolerates economic inequalities necessary
to improve the position of the badly off only if the necessity is independent
of the choices and intentions of the most advantaged. Under the latter, the
principles countenance any inequality necessary to improve on the badly
off.23
Cohen accepts the strength of the Pareto argument as regards the actual
social world, in which capitalistic motivations lead people to maximize
profits and exploit their natural and social advantages. But he says that,
in a society governed by an ethos that exalted the value of fraternity, people
would endorse the difference principle under its strict reading. Being
committed to fraternity, the talented and more productive would not choose
any unnecessary economic inequality. Instead, they would only accept economic
inequalities that are strictly necessary to alleviate the position of the badly
off, that is, necessary apart from their motivations and choices. 24 For
example, the talented and more productive would be prepared to work as
hard at a 60 percent tax rate as they do at 40 percent. Thus, the talented
would be motivated to work hard and contribute to the common good even
if they are subjected to such tax rates as are needed to equalize economic
rewards for labor.
Cohen thinks that the problem with implementing socialism in the real
world is that we lack a suitable institutional technology to make the economic
system work within the limits of human nature.25 Like Dworkin, Cohen
acknowledges that markets provide information about how various goods
are valuable to people. But he suggests that organizing cooperative endeavors
that can function effectively without a free market might be possible. Cohen’s
exploration starts with an imaginary camping trip. Campers decide to collectivize
tools, goods, and labor based on luck egalitarianism and communal caring
principles.26 Cohen claims that the camping trip realizes the ideal of socialist
equality of opportunity. This ideal treats both social and native or inborn
disadvantages as sources of injustice and hence wants to remove all unchosen
constraints against equality.27 In the camping trip, inequalities generated
by voluntary choices are permissible only if they do not offend communal
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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G. A. COHEN, WHY NOT SOCIALISM? 57–58 (2009).
Id. at 3–11.
Id. at 14–19.

SPECTOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 439, 2022]

9/29/2022 11:14 AM

Luck Egalitarianism
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

caring. Besides this luck egalitarian principle, the trip is then ruled by a
community principle, which seeks to curb those significant inequalities caused
by option luck that are, therefore, permitted by equality of opportunity.28
The trip (supposedly) works well because every camper knows how to
contribute to the common good. However, Cohen recognizes that
implementation in large societies confronts the institutional designer with
extraordinary difficulties given the limits of human nature. Yet, he hopes
that these difficulties are surmountable (though he is doubtful that they
are). It is crucial to notice that both Dworkin’s immigrants’ island and Cohen’s
camping trip are stylized economies from which the problems of specialized
production, innovation, and investment are assumed away. Dworkin and
Cohen recognize the role of markets in social valuation, yet they fail to
discuss the relationship between equality and social valuation in real world economies. It is on this task that I now embark.
III. THE INDETERMINACY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY
Capitalism embodies competitive markets that reward factors of production
according to their marginal contribution to producing valuable goods and
services. Within legal constraints, labor time sold or invested by workers,
professionals, and entrepreneurs is valued in a capitalistic system at different
prices, according to their marginal productivity. Through their market
interactions, consumers and producers fix the value of various goods and
the value of different kinds of labor time, regardless of its social or legal
form (e.g., wages, business profits, etc.). Thus, capitalism assigns unequal
rewards to different individuals for their labor time, and these differential
rewards will almost always produce an inequality of condition. Economic
inequality is an essential aspect of capitalism, not because capitalism seeks
inequality per se, but because its method of social valuation of products
and services is hardly separable from an inegalitarian distribution of income
and wealth. Inequality is the price to pay for using a price system.
According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities can be permissible if they
derive from people’s choices rather than their circumstances. At first blush,
this appears to suggest that, even if market inequalities infringe equality
of condition, they are justifiable by the principle of responsibility. However,
by definition, a competitive market affects people’s conditions via their
market choices. Thus, luck egalitarianism permits inequalities caused by

28.

Id. at 30–34.
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competitive markets. In contrast, it bans inequalities of condition produced
by unchosen contingencies and circumstances, among them brute luck.
Still, inequalities originating from individuals’ circumstances are unjustifiable
for luck egalitarians. And the fact is that in capitalistic systems, many
inequalities are attributable to social and economic circumstances (brute
luck). For example, different educational, training, and social backgrounds
are consequential in people’s unequal abilities to obtain income and accumulate
wealth. Such inequalities could be removed or mitigated by proper
arrangements. Thus, an effective educational system, equally accessible
to all, might suppress or reduce those inequalities.
In addition, markets operate against the background of legal institutions
that grant individuals the power to benefit from their unequal endowments,
not only their different ambitions. Capitalistic institutions tolerate those
inequalities and often exacerbate their effects. For example, capitalistic
legal systems allow individuals to sell the output of their innate and acquired
endowments, even if these endowments can be considered circumstances
rather than the results of voluntary choices. Thus, capitalism permits voluntary
and mutually advantageous transactions that depend on the parties using
or transferring resources produced with their natural abilities and talents.
In effect, individuals can sell whatever they produce with their natural
endowments and legitimately acquired resources. For example, Salvador
Dalí became rich by selling his works in the US, but a good deal of the
value of his artworks resulted from his natural talent instead of his voluntary
choices.
Since prices of products and services transacted in the marketplace
express the influence of initial endowments, it is complicated to determine
the exact magnitude of permissible and impermissible inequalities in practice.
Strictly speaking, perfectly competitive markets do not cause unchosen
inequalities. Instead, the background scheme of private property, corporate
ownership, and alienation rights generates those inequalities through the
operation of markets. The tendency to equate economic markets with the
system of private ownership of the means of production explains a good
deal of the egalitarians’ opposition to markets.
Under the responsibility principle, producers and workers may be entitled
to unequal economic rewards due to their different voluntary choices. But
how is the function between unequal rewards and specific voluntary choices
to be defined? The principle of responsibility determines the conditions
under which a result (a benefit or a loss) can be assigned to an individual’s
choice but does not provide a criterion to measure the social worth of that
result. To illustrate the indeterminacy of the principle of responsibility, I
will offer a hypothetical not too distant from the real world, namely, a bit
of fictional Yugoslavia that endorses luck egalitarianism and, therefore,
resembles market socialist Yugoslavia.
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Western economists used to study the Yugoslav experiments in market
socialism to discuss employing market prices to organize a non-Soviet
version of socialism. 29 After the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, Yugoslavia
implemented experimental economic reforms (basically, workers’ selfmanagement practices in state-owned enterprises), saluted in Western
socialist circles as progressing to democratic socialism. Now imagine that
one of the socialist experiments was the implementation of luck egalitarian
forms of redistributing income and wealth. Indeed, state-owned enterprises
with workers’ self-management seem favorable institutions to implement
luck egalitarianism. There was a dark side to the Yugoslav socialist experiments
that became known only in recent years. Between 1949 and 1956, Tito’s
regime used the Yugoslav secret police (the Udba) to incarcerate political
dissidents on Goli Otok. The political dissidents were tens of thousands
of socialists who remained faithful to the Stalinist wing of communism.
By detaining them at Goli Otok, the more “liberal” Yugoslav socialists
sought to re-educate them into the democratic variety of socialism.
Lamentably, the inmates were subjected to brutal psychiatric techniques.30
Now, imagine that the dissidents opposed market socialism and luck
egalitarianism. Stalinists were not sensitive to technical subtleties, so this
variation is insignificant. Then -the fictional story goes on- the techniques
in Goli Otok were oriented to making the Stalinists understand the merits
of luck egalitarianism. Historically, one key figure in the experiments at
Goli Otok was the military psychiatrist Vladislav Klajn. According to some
reports, Vladislav tried to re-educate the inmates into the new form of
socialism with authoritarian methods.
Luck egalitarianism says nothing about the treatment of dissidents.
Tragically, Vladislav had the right talents and skills for serving the regime
effectively. My fictional Tito was committed to luck egalitarianism. So,
he ought to compensate his collaborators by luck egalitarian criteria. Tito
knew that Vladislav was gifted to lead the re-education experiments but
unworthy of a higher income (or welfare) for his natural advantages. Yet,
he believed that Vladislav was entitled to a higher reward for securing the
self-management and luck egalitarian programs. These efforts were a
matter of personal choice. In authoritarian regimes, high unequal rewards
29. For a criticism of this tendency, see SVETOZAR PEJOVICH, THE MARKET-PLANNED
ECONOMY OF YUGOSLAVIA (1966).
30. Simone Cristicchi, Goli Otok, Tito’s forgotten lager, L’ESPRESSO INTERNATIONAL
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://espresso.repubblica.it/internazionale/2018/01/11/news/goli-otokviaggio-nell-isola-dei-dannati-lager-di-tito-1.316947.
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for bureaucrats’ equalizing efforts are typically considered permissible.
Does luck egalitarianism permit Vladislav’s higher income?
This story illustrates an assumption in luck egalitarianism. Intuitively,
Tito misunderstood the content of luck egalitarianism. It seems evident
that Vladislav ought not to get a higher income based on the principle of
responsibility (he rather deserved punishment for his repressive actions).
Though Vladislav chose to render his invaluable services to the regime,
such services were not worthy of increased economic reward.
Arneson distinguishes between two different conceptions of the principle
of responsibility, which he calls Choice and Desert. According to the former,
an inequality is not wrong if it arises via people’s voluntary choices
(within a fair framework for interaction). According to Desert (the most
robust version of luckism), an inequality is not wrong if it tracks people’s
relative praiseworthiness or blameworthiness.31 Thus, Desert discards
inequalities that result from people’s voluntary choices but do not commensurate
with a person’s level of deservingness.
Arneson’s distinction is relevant here. Vladislav’s example shows that
Choice is too weak to account for various intuitions about what justice
demands as a matter of personal choice.
On the other hand, Desert is too strong. The immigrant on Dworkin’s
island who uses his clamshells to purchase resources for consumption
rather than production does not deserve to be poorer, for he harms no one.
However, he cannot reasonably complain about the resulting inequality.
Thus, an intermediate possibility seems appropriate. For example, the principle
of responsibility could be construed as stating that inequalities resulting
from voluntary choices about which no one can reasonably complain do
not violate the strictures of distributive justice. Vladislav’s inequality-generating
choices were voluntary, but there were many (prisoners and their families)
who could reasonably complain about those choices.
Therefore, the principle of responsibility should be supplemented by a
criterion that defines the unobjectionable inequality-producing choices.
Rather than being specific about this criterion, luck egalitarians leave the
principle of responsibility indeterminate or incomplete. Let me explain.
The principle of responsibility cannot be understood as the claim that a
subject S is entitled to an unequal higher retribution R because he has
made choice C, which is tied to R in the relevant institutional structure. If
we adopted this interpretation, we should say that Vladislav was entitled
to an unequal higher income (or welfare) in our fictional Yugoslavia. But
Vladislav’s higher pay is unjustified. Therefore, luck egalitarianism cannot
be interpreted as a form of legitimizing this distributional inequality.

31.
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The relevant claim to justify S’s permission to get an unequal retribution
R is that S is entitled to R because S has made voluntary choices that generate
a justice ground for the inequality. Thus, if Vladislav was entitled to a
higher income, there should be a valid ground for the inequality (i.e., one
that is not attributable to brute luck). But then, the luck egalitarian who
makes that claim must identify the ground validating the unequal earning
to which Vladislav was supposedly entitled.
It’s difficult to assess or measure the value of voluntary choices other
than by considering the social worth of their outcomes. Thus, the following
two-pronged principle of responsibility seems intuitively appealing:
Responsibility. A subject S is entitled to unequal reward R for an outcome O
because (1) S is responsible for O and (2) O is socially valuable.

Luck egalitarians emphasize the first prong in Responsibility yet say little
or nothing about the second prong. Unlike luck egalitarianism, the incentives
argument relies on the social value of incentivizing talented individuals.
But the incentives argument does not distinguish between misfortunes and
choices. Regardless of whether valuable outcomes are caused by natural
talents, social contingencies, or deliberate efforts, the incentives argument
holds that an egalitarian society can justifiably uphold unequal retributions to
ambitious or talented individuals to harness their productive or entrepreneurial
abilities to everyone’s advantage or the advantage of the badly off. In its
standard formulations, the principle of responsibility is not coupled with
a definition of social value. Responsibility casts this indeterminacy into
sharp relief.
Luck egalitarians hold that inequalities in holdings caused by people’s
voluntary choices do not contradict equality-based demands. And two leading
advocates of luck egalitarianism say that voluntary choices that satisfy the
Pareto argument are not valid grounds for complaint.
On the contrary, some inequalities arising from voluntary choices may
be advantageous to some people and disadvantageous to no one. Thus, for
example, Dworkin claims that, in the auction market, people are at liberty
to exchange their clamshells for different resources to improve their lot.
And Cohen says that inequalities that are Pareto improving under the strict
reading are not morally objectionable. Moreover (and now leaving aside
polemical goals), the second prong of Responsibility requires a criterion
of social value. A Paretian conception of social value seems to provide
the most plausible interpretation.
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Suppose an individual in our luck egalitarian Yugoslavia earns less than
the officially decreed equal income because he prefers to devote more
time to leisure than work. This inequality would not contradict the luck
egalitarian policy as the resulting income or welfare inequality would have
been caused by his legitimate voluntary choice rather than by his circumstances.
Is the two-pronged principle of responsibility satisfied in this case? Yes,
because by choosing to dedicate greater time to leisure, that individual gets
better off, and no one becomes worse off. The inequality resulting from
a subject’s voluntary choices is justified because it generates a Pareto
improvement, which means no one has valid grounds for complaint.
The Paretian interpretation of social value in Responsibility does not
make the principle of responsibility equivalent to the incentives argument.
Whereas the incentives argument justifies inequalities based on their
consequences, the principle of responsibility rests on the idea of accountability
for one’s impact on others’ lives. The Pareto argument is consequentialist,
and the principle of responsibility is deontological. Further, since the
Pareto argument is based on consequences, it is not sensitive to the moral
difference between native endowments, social backgrounds, and deliberate
choices. In contrast, the principle of responsibility is confined to choices,
as no one should be rewarded for just his native endowment or social
background.
Luck egalitarianism would imply (if applied) that Vladislav deserved a
higher income due to his services to the luck egalitarian Yugoslavia. But
I have already suggested that this conclusion distorts luck egalitarianism
because it disregards the second prong of Responsibility. The outcomes of
Vladislav’s choices were far from a social Pareto improvement. Since
these actions involved brutal tortures, many people were harmed, which
means that the outcome was not socially valuable in Paretian terms.
Hence, Vladislav was not entitled to a higher income based on his choices.
While some choices lead to actions that improve the situation of some
members of society without worsening anyone’s situation, other options
produce consequences that are harmful to some people (even if they may
be beneficial to others).
The Paretian interpretation of Responsibility also gives a concrete meaning
to the mathematical function linking worthy choices with unequal rewards.
Without a criterion of social value, the luck egalitarian can’t know the
magnitude of inequality that the principle of responsibility licenses. The
responsibility principle says that producers and workers may claim unequal
economic rewards in proportion to their different voluntary choices.
However, the principle on its face lacks the quantitative dimension needed
to give concrete meaning to the function that attaches unequal economic
rewards to productive efforts. The Paretian interpretation provides content to
the function because the price system computes the social cost of different
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individuals’ efforts and the social benefits of their outcomes. I explore
this role of the price system in the following section.
IV. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PRICE SYSTEM
As is well known, Friedrich Hayek first called attention to the information
function by stating that “the economic problem of society is [. . .] not
merely a problem of how to allocate ‘given’ resources.”32 Hayek says: “It
is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to
any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only
these individuals know.”33 Hayek argues that the relative importance of
different resources depends on knowledge of people, local conditions, and
changing circumstances of time and place that by their very nature cannot
be possessed by a central planner.34 The price system conveys information
dispersed among many people and thus enables economic actors to coordinate
their multiple actions into a cooperative pattern. It leads to an optimal
allocation of resources avoiding the problem of collectivizing dispersed
knowledge. Thus, political authority does not need to plan this pattern (nor
would it be able to do so).
As I said in section II, both Dworkin and Cohen acknowledge that
market prices are needed to provide information about the relative value
of various resources and activities. In Dworkin’s island, the hypothetical
auction substitutes a real market in communicating information about the
social cost of the resources the immigrants want to acquire with their
clamshells. And there is no need to have a price system in Cohen’s
camping trip because Cohen assumes that the campers possess the relevant
knowledge. Cohen makes this explicit when he says: “One reason why
the camping trip can readily do without market exchange is that the
information that the campers need to plan their activities is modest in
extent, and comparatively easy to obtain and to aggregate.”35
Cohen says that prices fulfill their motivational function by incentivizing
individuals to maximize their profits. It is also true that prices incentivize
individuals to satisfy other people’s preferences via market exchanges.
However, Cohen takes it for granted that capitalism is moved by repugnant

32.
33.
34.
35.

FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77 (1948).
Id. at 78.
Id. at 80.
G. A. COHEN, WHY NOT SOCIALISM? 60–61 (2009).
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motives, such as greed and fear.36 He rhetorically asks: “Who would propose
running a society on the basis of such motives, and thereby promoting the
psychology to which they belong, if they were not known to be effective,
if they did not have the instrumental value which is the only value that
they have?”37
Cohen accepts Adam Smith’s justification of market institutions. Thus,
he asserts: “In the famous statement in which Adam Smith justified
market relations, he pointed out that we place our faith not in the butcher’s
generosity but in his self-interest when we rely on him to provision us.”38
But the butcher’s self-interest is not the same as the butcher’s greed and
fear. There are many motivations that producers could have in pursuing
market relations. Max Weber claims that capitalists do not ultimately pursue
their profit but rather a transcendent mission. His account of the capitalist
ethos is different from Smith’s. On the Weberian view, capitalists seek
professional and commercial success to discharge their religious a nd
communal duties.39 Weber cites Benjamin Franklin’s Advice to a Young
Tradesman to illustrate the ethos of capitalism. For example, Franklin says
about the virtue of industriousness and the vice of idleness:
Remember that time is money. He that can earn ten shillings a day by his labour,
and goes abroad, or sits idle, one half of that day, though he spends but sixpence
during his diversion or idleness, ought not to reckon that the only expense; he has
really spent, or rather thrown away, five shillings besides.40

These are not repugnant motives. They might be agent-centered motives,
in that Weberian capitalists are concerned about their virtue and salvation.
Still, it’s only by serving their community that they can realize their moral
or religious aspirations. Weber regards these motivations as moral, as can
be attested by the following paragraph: “The earning of money within the
modern economic order is, so long as it is done legally, the result and the
expression of virtue and proficiency in a calling; and this virtue and proficiency
are, as it is now not difficult to see, the real Alpha and Omega of Franklin’s
ethic. . . .”41 My point is not that all capitalists fit within Weber’s ideal
type, but rather that some capitalists might belong to it. Even if Weber

36. Id. at 40, 44, 77.
37. Id. at 77.
38. Id.
39. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott
Parsons, trans. 2001). Jason Brennan imagines a libertarian capitalistic community, Mickey
Mouse Clubhouse Village, that is governed by altruistic or generous motives. See JASON
BRENNAN, WHY NOT CAPITALISM? (2014).
40. WEBER, supra note 39.
41. Id. at 19.
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was not right, he showed that repugnant motives do not necessarily drive
capitalism.
Cohen distinguishes between two functions of market prices: “Now,
market prices serve two logically distinguishable functions: an information
function and a motivation function.”42 The thesis of the logical separation
of these two functions enables Cohen to entertain the belief that innovative
institutional designs could allow socialist governments to overcome the
difficulties imposed by the need to appeal to the informational role of
prices. The key to these proposals is to draw on human unselfish propensities
and ensure social discipline to the degree that could turn market socialism
into a practicable system.43 In a nutshell, the key would be to introduce
institutional arrangements that could make society-wide socialism as
manageable as his camping trip.
Can the information function and the motivational function of prices be
kept apart? Suppose there was a possible world in which economic agents’
motivations ceased to be self-interested and the informational content
transmitted by prices remained nonetheless invariant. We can see in that
case that the two functions are logically distinguishable. Cohen thinks
that a socialist State might retain the informational role of prices and give
up the motivational function by transforming people’s greedy preferences
into decent ones. He claims that the main obstacle to this transformation
does not lie in the inflexibility of human nature but rather in problems of
social technology. In superb prose, he asserts:
In my view, the principal problem that faces the socialist ideal is that we do not
know how to design the machinery that would make it run. Our problem is not,
primarily, human selfishness, but our lack of a suitable organizational technology: our
problem is a problem of design. It may be an insoluble design problem, and it is
a design problem that is undoubtedly exacerbated by our selfish propensities, but
a design problem, so I think, is what we’ve got. 44

To clarify his point, Cohen cites the model based on moral incentives
proposed by Joseph H. Carens.45 In this model, moral incentives substitute
income incentives to induce a high level of effort from the members of
society. By “moral incentives,” Carens means “incentives based on the
desire to serve society or to perform one’s duty to society.” He thinks that
42.
43.
44.
45.

G. A. COHEN, WHY NOT SOCIALISM? 61 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 57–58.
JOSEPH H. CARENS, EQUALITY, MORAL INCENTIVES, AND THE MARKET, AN ESSAY IN
UTOPIAN POLITICO-ECONOMIC THEORY (1981).
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moral incentives are “the key element needed to make it possible for a
politico-economic system to combine equal distribution of income with
efficient use of the market mechanism.”46 In this model, redistributive
taxation implements equal distribution, which ensures that everyone gets
an equal after-tax income for consumption.47 Unlike luck egalitarians,
Carens does not accept departures from this radically egalitarian redistributive
scheme. He does not define moral incentives as altruistic but rather as
motives to do one’s part to maximize the total social income. Social-duty
satisfactions substitute satisfactions derived from acquiring income for
consumption. Carens’s social-duty satisfaction might be defined as the
motive to achieve a socially optimal equilibrium.
Carens supposes that each individual does his part in serving society by
earning as much pre-tax income as possible, even if he anticipates that his
after-tax income will be reduced to the equal income-share. Carens imagines
that social-duty satisfactions have the same relative value as incomeconsumption satisfactions.48 Carens’ egalitarian society seeks to reproduce
the informational role of the price system without the motivations characteristic
of capitalism. This is done by adding a tax program equalizing consumption
earnings. Unlike self-interested motivations, the rule that equalizes aftertax income for consumption does not preclude social-duty motivations.
Though people act as profit maximizers, their decisions are not guided by
income-consumption satisfactions but by the purpose of serving society.
This purpose can concur with a scheme that equalizes everyone’s after-tax
income. From a motivational viewpoint, as Carens himself acknowledges,
his egalitarian society resembles capitalism as portrayed by Weber.49 The
crucial difference is that Carens introduces equalizing taxation and assumes
that people seek to achieve a socially valuable equilibrium via the price
system. So Carens’ imaginary society is a logically possible world in which
community-oriented motivations substitute self-interested ones, yet prices’
informational role is retained. This hypothetical economic system shows
that Cohen is correct in asserting that the information function of prices is
logically distinguishable from their motivational function.
But Carens’ possible world is either empirically infeasible or unsustainable.
Cohen concedes in the passage quoted above that we lack a suitable
organizational technology that can drastically transform people’s motivations.
Moreover, David Hume, for example, observed that human beings have
limited generosity. This kind of observation probably led Adam Smith to
think that “[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or
46.
47.
48.
49.
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the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own
self-interest.”50 As Cohen acknowledges, the problem of implementing a
society based on purely benevolent motivations is insurmountable.
But let’s leave aside the feasibility problem. Though logically possible,
an egalitarian society animated by duty-satisfaction motivations could not
sustain itself in the long run. Both in capitalism and Carens’ system agents
are not required to maximize their total income. Instead, they can devote
time to leisure or pleasant occupations that are not income-maximizing. In a
market economy, people balance their preferences for income-consumption
with their preferences for leisure and occupational enjoyment (i.e., the
enjoyment derived from not income-maximizing occupations).
Similarly, in a Carensian society, people will balance their goal to serve
society with their leisure and occupational enjoyment choices. Carens
stipulates that the marginal rate of substitution of income-consumption
satisfaction and leisure (MRS1) in a market economy is identical to the
marginal substitution rate of social duty-satisfaction and leisure (MRS2)
in his egalitarian society. But while MRS1 can be part of an incomeconsumption satisfaction/leisure equilibrium, MRS2 will most likely not
be part of a social duty-satisfaction/leisure equilibrium, for MRS2 is
subject to a kind of strategic interaction that is absent from MRS1.
In a market economy, everyone must pay for the cost of each additional
unit of leisure he is willing to enjoy. Therefore, an individual who chooses
to enjoy some leisureliness makes a tradeoff between income and consumption
of free time. The marginal substitution rate tends to be stable for each
individual because she pays the total cost of her choice in terms of decreased
income. Thus, her choices over income and leisure are self-regulated. Instead,
in Carens’ egalitarian society, individuals seek to pursue a social optimum,
but this optimum is a sort of public good. That is, whatever additional unit
of leisure anyone wishes to enjoy, he will cause only a minimal deviation
from the social goal. Thus, he can rely on others’ contributions to achieve
the common social goal.
The same observation applies to occupational enjoyment. In a market
economy, everyone pays for the total cost of choosing an enjoyable but
less profitable occupation; in the egalitarian society, it’s only a minimal
deviation from the social goal that anyone will cause by, say, devoting his
time to poem writing. Further, shirking would not be visible in an egalitarian
50. ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Edwin Cannan, ed. 2006).
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society because everyone could conceal her strategy by pretending to
change the marginal substitution rate. But then, if the purpose of serving
society is regarded as a result-oriented action, a sort of prisoner’s dilemma
arises. Everyone is motivated to shirk social-duty performance and rationalize
that behavior as a change of his marginal substitution rate between serving
society by earning as much as he can and pursuing personal enjoyment.
It’s sufficient that a few members start to follow consciously or unconsciously
this strategy. Every other member would soon realize that the dominant
strategy is to laze around, play sports or chat with friends. In this way, the
actual relative value placed by everyone on fulfilling the social duty would
gradually diminish, and the egalitarian society would eventually decline
into poverty.
Alternatively, Carens might define the motivation of each member of
his egalitarian society in moralized terms. Instead of being concerned with
socially valuable results, they might be committed to doing their share in
the collective enterprise. Whatever the impact of shirking on the collective
goal, a leisurely member would suffer a moral loss in lessening his contribution
to the social income. Since moral duty is defined as contributing to a
collective goal, causing any deviation from that goal would be morally
wrongful. Now the social responsibility to contribute to the social income
is not absolute. Carens assumes that the members of the egalitarian society
are permitted to devote time to leisure. But then the crucial question is
where to place the moral threshold between the social duty and the agentcentered permission to enjoy leisure (e.g., the dolce far niente). Carens
stipulates that the substitution rate in his egalitarian society is identical to
the rate of substitution in capitalism. But this is a factual assumption, not
a moral one. He does not say that the moral threshold between the social
duty and the agent-centered permission ought to match the marginal substitution
rate in capitalism. The equality between MRS2 (Carens’ rate) and MRS1
(the capitalist rate) does not imply that the strength of the moral permission
not to produce mirrors the relative value of leisure under MRS2. Instead,
it seems reasonable to think that the moral permission not to produce has
varying degrees of strength depending on the importance that each person
attaches to his projects and concerns. Again, a sort of prisoner’s dilemma
would arise. Everyone would be motivated to argue that his moral permission
not to work is stronger given his dispositions and projects. A societal decline
would then occur out of a gradual change in people’s moral priorities. The
increasing permissibility not to work would be paired with decreasing
demandingness to work. Everyone would be inclined to follow the same
strategy. He would sooner than later believe that, in choosing to enjoy an
additional unit of leisure, he does not violate a social duty but rather exercises
his permission to disregard the demands of a bourgeois conception of the
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good life. In short, an egalitarian system based on duty-satisfaction motivations
is not sustainable.
Therefore, even if there is a logically possible world in which the
epistemic function of prices is separable from their motivational function
(i.e., Carens’ egalitarian society), that world is either infeasible or unsustainable.
The problem is not only that we lack a “suitable institutional technology,”
as Cohen asserts. Any sustainable social world in which market prices perform
their informational role must include a feedback mechanism that prevents
the kinds of prisoner’s dilemmas mentioned above. That mechanism should
make people internalize the costs of their choices for leisure or enjoyable
occupations. But the only way to ensure self-regulation is to draw on the
motivational function of prices: no information without motivation.
V. LUCK EGALITARIANISM AND SOCIAL VALUATION
The preceding section concludes that, in any feasible or sustainable
large society, the information function of market prices goes hand in hand
with their motivation function. Thus, we cannot apply Responsibility without
a method of social valuation. Still, the only form of social valuation available
in a feasible or sustainable large society is the price system (as Dworkin
and Cohen acknowledge). Therefore, not only the Pareto argument but also
Responsibility presupposes a price system.
A price system is essential to luck egalitarianism because Responsibility
is a component of this doctrine. According to the principle of responsibility,
the luck egalitarian justification of inequality requires a criterion of social
value because efforts that served no social purpose could support no one’s
ground to unequal earnings (e.g., Vladislav’s pursuits). What are the
consequences of acknowledging that Responsibility requires a system of
market prices? If market prices alone can appraise the value of individual
contributions, the principle of responsibility presupposes a system of market
prices. Absent market prices (and their epistemic function), individuals
would not know what natural talents to develop and use or where and how
much to employ their initiative and efforts. Training and using one’s inborn
gifts or socially shaped talents require significant effort. Without a price
system, no one would know what natural or socially acquired skills to develop
and use, for he would be unable to establish the social value of alternative
uses of talent. Ignorant about this value, everyone would gravitate toward
applying his efforts to gratifying engagements. Therefore, to apply the
principle of responsibility, we need a system to measure the social value
of alternative uses of talent and alternative employments of effort. That
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system is a system of market prices that performs the information and
motivation functions simultaneously.
Generally, if a principle P2 defeats a principle P1, P1 must be complied
with in all instances where P2 does not apply. Now, the principle of responsibility
defeats the principle of equality because it justifies inequalities arising
from some individuals claiming special credit for their choices and efforts
(not for the mere exercise of their natural talents or socially acquired skills).
Thus, the principle of equality should be fulfilled outside those cases
contemplated by Responsibility. That is, as regards unchosen inequalities,
compliance with the principle of equality should be inescapable. However,
we cannot apply Responsibility without market prices because prices make it
possible to know when unequal earnings are justified. But a system
of market prices causes both chosen and unchosen inequalities almost
tautologically. Retribution is just the price for labor time measured by its
ability to satisfy others’ preferences. This price does not reflect the chosen
or unchosen nature of the talents, skills, and efforts involved in producing
that labor. Thus, equalization of earnings is at odds with market prices
fulfilling their information function in any feasible or sustainable large
society.
The principle of responsibility does not merely defeat the principle of
equality but instead presupposes its rejection in all empirically possible
worlds. Therefore, no reasonable trade-off between equality and responsibility
is possible. Pervasive inequality is what we’ve got in such a system. The
government can undoubtedly adopt narrowly tailored measures that curb
some evident forms of natural and social brute luck (for instance, educational
vouchers or health insurance). However, these measures should not impair
the background system of market prices for products and labor. Alternatively,
we could give up Responsibility and embrace pure egalitarianism.
In a nutshell, my argument relies on two propositions: (1) the most
effective arrangement to hold individuals accountable for their individual
contributions to the common good is a system of market prices for assessing
various economic, labor, and professional activities, and (2) market prices
are insensitive to desert-based considerations. From these premises, we
can conclude that in all empirically possible worlds holding individuals
accountable for their social contributions leads to pervasive inequality of
earnings. In fact, to achieve a significant degree of equality of condition
the government should adopt a comprehensive program of political pricing
of various forms of labor time. But the effectiveness of the system of market
prices to make individuals internalize the true costs and benefits of their
voluntary choices requires the exclusion of political prices for their labor
time. Under those conditions, the true value of alternative uses of talent,
efforts, and labor time remains unknown, and, therefore, it becomes impossible
to have people internalize the social benefits and costs of their choices.
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As Hayek explains, differences of reward in the marketplace do not
reflect differences of moral merit but differences in social valuableness.51
Proportionality of reward to moral merit is impossible because governments
lack sufficient information to determine (1) the value of various initiatives
and attempts, (2) the extent of praiseworthy effort involved in those
initiatives and attempts, and (3) the degree to which an individual’s valuable
outcomes are attributable to his free choice rather than to his natural or
social fortune. In this respect, Hayek says:
The inborn as well as the acquired gifts of a person clearly have a value to his
fellows which does not depend on any credit due to him for possessing them.
There is little a man can do to alter the fact that his special talents are very common
or exceedingly rare. A good mind or a fine voice, a beautiful face or a skillful
hand, and a ready wit or an attractive personality are in a large measure as independent
of a person’s efforts as the opportunities or the experiences he has had.52

Instead of a system of moral merit requiring a kind of factual and moral
knowledge that governments do not have, a free society must hold individuals
accountable for the objective results of their contributions as measured by
market prices. A regime of objective responsibility for valuable outcomes
that avoids judgments of true merit is agreeable to a free society. Hayek’s
point is worth quoting:
It is because we want people to use knowledge which we do not possess that we
let them decide for themselves. But insofar as we want them to be free to use
capacities and knowledge of facts which we do not have, we are not in a position
to judge the merit of their achievements.53

The inner tension within luck egalitarianism results from the two intuitions
that it seeks to combine. On the one hand, the egalitarian intuition derives
from the socialist opposition to capitalism and the defense of an institutional
system that distributes resources or welfare in keeping with non-market,
political criteria. On the other hand, the responsibility-based intuition is
kindred to the ethos of capitalism. According to Cohen, Dworkin has
“performed for egalitarianism the considerable service of incorporating
within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the antiegalitarian Right:
the idea of choice and responsibility.”54 In the same vein, Elizabeth S.
Anderson says:
51.
52.
53.
54.

F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 93–95 (1960).
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, supra note 3.
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For the outcomes for which individuals are held responsible, luck egalitarians
prescribe rugged individualism: let the distribution of goods be governed by
capitalist markets and other voluntary agreements [. . .] For the outcomes
determined by brute luck, equality of fortune prescribes that all good fortune be
equally shared and that all risks be pooled.55

She adds that equality of fortune prescribes:
[f]ree markets, to govern the distribution of goods attributable to factors for which
individuals are responsible, and the welfare state, to govern the distribution of
goods attributable to factors beyond the individual’s control.56

Thus, by incorporating the idea of responsibility, luck egalitarianism
accommodates the ethical intuitions that Max Weber calls “the spirit of
capitalism.” In this connection, it is pertinent to note that luck egalitarianism’s
choice/luck divide echoes Machiavelli’s distinction between fortuna and
virtù.57 Though Machiavelli’s conception of fortune does not wholly
overlap with the luck egalitarian one, it is evident that the difference
between choice and luck is characteristic of the sort of republican commercial
society that Machiavelli sought to dissect. A radical approach to socioeconomic
equality (one that did not justify ambition-sensitive inequalities) would
fail to recognize the ethical value of hard work, as both the hard-working
and the idle would get the same economic reward. But if egalitarianism
includes, as it does, the idea of responsibility for socioeconomic outcomes,
its endorsement of equality weakens via the argument from social valuation.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have argued that luck egalitarianism blends two principles that largely
exclude each other in any feasible or sustainable large society. First, luck
egalitarians claim that distributive justice requires an egalitarian distribution
of resources or welfare. Second, they accept that a just society can assign
unequal shares to each individual according to his choices and responsibilities.
I contended that whether some individual choices are worthy of unequal
shares of resources or welfare cannot be judged absent a criterion of social
value. The only available measure of social value in a large society is the
market value of individuals’ productive contributions. But the market
value of productive contributions is inconceivable without an economic
structure that fixes differential prices for the outputs of various talents and
efforts. Therefore, the social value criterion presupposed by luck egalitarianism
requires price inequality for several types of labor time. This inequality
is practically incompatible with systematic egalitarian redistribution.
55.
56.
57.
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Imaginary islands and camping trips notwithstanding, in real-world economies
of specialized production, innovation, and consumption, responsibility
leaves little room for equality as a matter of practice. The tension between
accountability and equality does not amount to contradiction because the
proposition that a large society implements a good deal of each principle
is not false in every possible world. However, that proposition is false in
most empirically possible worlds. In so far as luck egalitarianism is committed
to the spirit of capitalism, it must implement a system of market prices for
labor time that brings forth a significant degree of unchosen (as well as
chosen) inequality of condition.
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